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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this action the plaintiffs claim that their automobiles were damaged by "soot" or some such material
emitted from a flare stack maintained by the defendant
on its premises at its refinery at Woods Cross, Utah.
At the trial of the case the plaintiffs produced no direct
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant but
relied entirely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
After being instructed with respect to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, the jury returned a verdict in favor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the plaintiffs from which the defendant has appealed.
The flare stack is a steel pipe standing about 45
feet high and being 6 inches in diameter at its base
and reducing to a 4 inch diameter at the top (R 147, 148)
through which gas is emitted and burned (R 149, 150,
163, 164). It is essentially a safety device through which
excess gas may be disposed of without damage to various
units at the refinery (R 151). The gas that moves through
the flare stack is pure gas and contains no corrosive
or dangerous impurities (R 152, 167, 172, 173, 221).
When gas pressures in the various units which are
connected with the flare stack exceed certain amounts,
the excess gas can move out through the flare stack
without harm to any of the refinery units (R 149-151).
A very elaborate system is maintained to check the
operations in the refinery (R 161, 165) and the whole
operation is constantly under the scrutiny of refinery
personnel (R 161, 165, 205, 206). Some gas is kept continually moving through the flare stack and burned off
at the top thus serving the same purpose as a pilot
flame (R 152). Any excess gas "popped out" of the flare
stack is immediately burned off when emitted from the
stack (R 152).
There is a railroad station immediately to the east
of the lot where the flare stack is located (R 116). Trains
run regularly through the vicinity. The Hatch Chemical
Company is a short distance to the south. This company handles acids and caustics (R 147). The streets
that bound the lot where the flare stack is located on
the south and on the east carry considerable traffic,
2
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which traffic handles all types of products
and corrosive materials (R 146, 147).

~

even acids

On the 17th day of June, 1958, most of the plaintiffs'
autmnobiles had been parked generally to the east of
the flare stack in question. At about 4:30 P.~I. ~Irs.
Donnel Gwynn, the wife of one of the plaintiffs, drove
her husband's automobile to the vicinity of the refinery
where the plaintiffs were working for the purpose of
picking up her husband after work (R 79). She parked
on the street to the east of the lot where the flare stack
was located (R 79), and clain1s to have seen some
"soot" settling on her car (R 80). She observed the
flare stack which was about 300 feet west of her car
(R 183). She noted the orange flame at the top thereof
being blown to the east by an easterly wind (R. 80),
and the usual short smoke tail was observed at the
end of the flame (R 80, 148). She could not, however,
see "soot" actually being emitted from the flare stack
(R 87). She could see "soot" in the vicinity of her car
(R 86, 87), and she could see some "soot" in the air
back towards the flame, but could not see "soot" all
the way back to the flare stack (R 90). It seemed to
be coming from the west (R 88). It was only her conclusion that the "soot" was being emitted from the flare
stack (R 88).
Later it was discovered that the automobiles belonging to the other plaintiffs had likewise had some "soot''
or some such material deposited on them; however, no
witness was able to testify as to its source.
The plaintiffs claim that the paint on their automoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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biles became "pocked" from the "soot."
Though Mrs. Gwynn testified that "soot'' settled
all over her husband's automobile while she was parked
to the east of the lot where the flare stack was located
(R 85), yet Donnel Gwynn stated that in general the
"pock" marks were widely dispersed on the car (R 106).
According to Donnel Gwynn there appeared to be only
occasional pock marks in an area comparable in size
to an ordinary sheet of paper 8¥2" by 11". ~r[any such
areas on his car had no marks whatsoever (R 106).
The plaintiffs claim that the "soot" was the cause
of the damage sustained by the automobiles and that
the "soot" was emitted from the defendant's flare stack.
Having shown the existence of the flare, the presence
of the pilot flame with the usual smoke trail at the
end thereof and an easterly wind, the settling of "soot"
or other such material on Donnel Gwynn's automobile,
the plaintiffs rested the case and relied entirely upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant. No direct
evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the
defendant was introduced by the plaintiffs. The court
instructed the jury with respect to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur (R 51, 52), and the jury found for the
plaintiffs.
The defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable in this case and that there
is not sufficient evidence from which the jury could
justifiably conclude that the "soot" that caused the
4
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which traffic handles all types of products and corrosive materials (R 146, 147).

even acids

On the 17th day of June, 1958, most of the plaintiffs'
automobiles had been parked generally to the east of
the flare stack in question. At about 4 :30 P.~I. Mrs.
Donnel Gwynn, the wife of one of the plaintiffs, drove
her husband's automobile to the vicinity of the refinery
where the plaintiffs were working for the purpose of
picking up her husband after work (R 79). She parked
on the street to the east of the lot where the flare stack
was located (R 79), and clain1s to have seen some
"soot" settling on her car (R 80). She observed the
flare stack which was about 300 feet west of her car
(R 183). She noted the orange flame at the top thereof
being blown to the east by an easterly wind (R. 80),
and the usual short smoke tail was observed at the
end of the flame (R 80, 148). She could not, however,
see "soot" actually being emitted from the flare stack
(R 87). She could see "soot" in the vicinity of her car
(R 86, 87), and she could see some "soot'' in the air
back towards the flame, but could not see "soot" all
the way back to the flare stack (R 90). It seemed to
be coming from the west (R 88). It was only her conclusion that the "soot" was being emitted from the flare
stack (R 88).
Later it was discovered that the automobiles belonging to the other plaintiffs had likewise had some "soot''
or some such material deposited on them; however, no
witness was able to testify as to its source.
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biles became "pocked" from the "soot."
Though M.:rs. Gwynn testified that "soot'' settled
all over her husband's automobile while she was parked
to the east of the lot where the flare stack was located
(R 85), yet Donnel Gwynn stated that in general the
"pock" marks were widely dispersed on the car (R 106).
According to Donnel Gwynn there appeared to be only
occasional pock marks in an area comparable in size
to an ordinary sheet of paper 8lf2" by 11". Many such
areas on his car had no marks whatsoever (R 106).
The plaintiffs claim that the "soot" was the cause
of the damage sustained by the automobiles and that
the "soot" was emitted from the defendant's flare stack.
Having shown the existence of the flare, the presence
of the pilot flame with the usual smoke trail at the
end thereof and an easterly wind, the settling of "soot"
or other such material on Donnel Gwynn's automobile,
the plaintiffs rested the case and relied entirely upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant. No direct
evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the
defendant was introduced by the plaintiffs. The court
instructed the jury with respect to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur (R 51, 52), and the jury found for the
plaintiffs.
The defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable in this case and that there
is not sufficient evidence from which the jury could
justifiably conclude that the "soot" that caused the

4
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The flare stack in question is the original flare
stack which was installed over 25 years ago (R 204).
The evidence was that this is the only known occasion
in that period when such a claim for damage from
substances emitted by the flare stack in question has
been rnade ( R 153, 204).
The defendant further contends that the evidence
in this case does not support a finding by the jury
that the defendant was negligent. Even if the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was proper, any
presumption arising from the doctrine was completely
overcome by the evidence of the care and caution exercised by the defendant in the operation of its refinery
system, insofar as the flare stack in question was concerned.
The defendant contends that a glaring error was
made by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury
as to its duty to a corporate defendant. The personality
difference in the parties was most striking. The plaintiffs were common working men. The defendant was
a well-known oil company. Any experience at all in
the practicalities of jury trials would immediately suggest that the jury in this case would be extremely
sympathetic to the plaintiffs. Recognizing this practical
difficulty, counsel for the defendant requested the court
to instruct the jury in accordance with the instruction
No. 1.6 of J.I.F.U., which instruction would have admonished the jury with respect to its duty in regard to a
corporate defendant (R 59). To counsel's utter amazement and bewilderment, the trial court refused to give
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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such an instruction. The defendant contends that under
the facts of this case, it was entitled to the protection
afforded by such instruction.

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' AUTOMOBILES WERE DAMAGED BY "SOOT'' EMITTED FROM THE
DEFENDANT'S FLARE STACK IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT PERMIT
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
WERE PROPERLY APPLIED, ANY INFERENCE ARISING
THEREFROM WAS OVERCOME AND THE FINDING THAT
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM WAS NEGLIGENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.6 OF
J.I.F.U.

8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' AUTOMOBILES WERE DAMAGED BY "SOOT'' EMITTED FROM THE
DEFENDANT'S FLARE STACK IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.

The proximate cause of an injury can never be
presumed. J,ackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. (2d)
566 (1949).
The mere occurrence of an unusual or unexplained
accident or injury, if not such as necessarily involves
negligence, does not warrant the application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine. Cunningham v. Neil House Hotel
Co., 33 N.E. (2d) 859 (Ohio 1940).
The doctrine of res psa loquitur is not applicable
when the liability of defendant depends on surmise of
conjecture. Martin v. Southern Pac. Co., 46 F. Supp.
957 (D.C. Cal. 1942). It must not be allowed to prevail
where, on proof of the occurrence without more, the
matter rests only in conjecture. Dail v. Taylor, 66 S.E.
135 (North Carolina 1909).
In this case the evidence does not support a finding
that any harmful substance was emitted from the defendant's flare stack. That the plaintiffs' automobiles
were damaged does not prove that any harmful substance was emitted from the flare stack. It is mere
speculation and conjecture on the part of the jury to
so conclude. Only Mrs. Donnel Gwynn claims to have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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seen "soot" particles in the air. She could not see
them clear back to the flare (R 90). She simply saw
the orange flare with the usual smoke tail which was
only inert carbon (R 80, 147, 148, 158). In the vicinity
of her car she said she also saw "soot" (R. 86, 87).
The wind blowing to the east caused her to conclude
that the "soot" she saw was being emitted from the
stack. The "soot" she saw in the vicinity of her car
made film all over it (R 85). Yet, Donnel Gwynn says
the "pock" marks were widely scattered (R 106). There
is no direct evidence that any "soot" particles seen
by Mrs. Gwynn had their origin from the flare stack
or that damage came from the "soot." This is only her
conjecture (R 88). There is not any evidence that any
"soot" particles seen by Mrs. Gwynn in the vicinity
of the car was the substance that damaged the paint
on the automobiles. Sh~ saw a film of "soot" all over
her automobile, yet pock marks were widely dispursed
(R 85, 106). :Mr. Gwynn testified that in an area the
size of an ordinary sheet of paper 81f2" by 11" there
was possibly a mark or two, and in many areas on his
car no dmnage was observable (R 106).
The testimony of James Kenney (R 167, 168) was
confirmed by Dr. Sugihara (R 173) that no corrosive
or harmful substances were emitted frmn the flare stack.
l{enney's testimony is further supported by the evidence
showing the presence of the original flare stack without
any corrosive damage whatsoever (R 204). This is the
first such claim in the history of the operation of the
flare stack. Painted and metallic surfaces in the area
have never been damaged in the past (R 204, 205).

10
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Expert and cmnpetent witnesses testified that the smoke
trailing the flare on top of the stack was si1nply carbon
black which is chemically inert (R 147, 148, 158).
As further proof of the absence of any corrosive
material in the flare stack, James Kenney performed
the following experiment on the tailgate of a new
Chevrolet pick-up truck (R 192 193):
'

"The so-called drip tank is about nineteen
feet long and has a catch basin or drip accumulator. So immediately two days following this incident, I went out and drew about a half a pint
of the liquid collected in here. It was mostly
water with a little hydrocarbon on top of it. I
would say in the range of a butane Lpg, and
I took it in the building and poured it in a small
can and lit it off, and the fact that it was a
small can, it gave a very smoky oxygen deficiency.
Then I held the tail gate over that, so that the
smoke and this burning liquid, that they deposited
on the tail gate. Then in the middle of the tail
gate I took the remainder of the liquid, the
liquid itself, and poured it on the tail gate.
Then on the opposite end I took some natural
gas of Mountain States Fuel. I could have done
it at home on my stove, but I procured an
oxygen-deficiency flame by plugging off oxygen
to the burner, and it produced yellow, smoky
flame, and I deposited that on the other end of
the tail gate, let them sit two days, and examined
it and could find no damage to the paint, and
re-examination now after a year's time, the only
damage we can find is the very slight stain where
the liquid was poured, which will wipe off."
The painted surface of the tailgate was not damaged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in the least. The tailgate was admitted in evidence (D-11;
R. 194) and even after more than a year's time the
painted surface showed no damage whatsoever.
Had there been any injurious substances in the flare
system its concentration would have been greater in
the liquid in the drip tank than at the flame (R 194).
The material that damaged the plaintiffs' automobiles simply had to come from some other source.
On this point there is considerable similarity between the instant case and the case of J.ackson v.
Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. (2d) 566 (1959). In this
case the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for the alleged burning of her lower leg claimed to have
been inflicted while she was undergoing weight reducing
treatment administered by the defendants. It was her
theory that the lamp that had been used by the defendant
was the cause of the burning. There appeared to be
no doubt that the plaintiff was burned, that there
was a lamp, that it was pointed in her direction, and
was used in her treatment over a period of time. She
testified that after about five treatments she noticed
her ankle was becoming inflamed, etc. On the other
hand there was expert testimony regarding the nature
of the lamp; that the lamp was not a heat producing
lamp; that a person would be more likely to suffer
burn from having been exposed to sun light on a summer's day for ten minutes than it would have from
exposure to the infra-red lamp for the same period;
and that a normal person's flesh could not be burned
under the same conditions. The trial court directed '\
12
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verdict for the defendants. On appeal this court said:
"The only question here to be decided is
whether the court erred in directing a verdict
for the defendants. It is fundamental that the
burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the
causal connection between the injury and the
alleged negligence of the defendant; Tremelling
v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80; that
the court may not permit the jury to speculate
concerning defendants' liability; Dern Inv. Co.
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P.
2d 660; and that the court is required to direct
a verdict unless there is evidence from which
the jury could reasonably find in favor of the
plaintiff.
"Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur should be applied which, if considered together with plaintiff's testimony and
the medical evidence on her behalf, was sufficient
to require the court to submit the cause to the
jury. It is unnecessary for us to rule upon whether
the doctrine contended for ought to be invoked
because even if we were to so decide, it would have
no effect on the propriety of the ruling of the
trial court.* * *
"In a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may relieve the plaintiff of the duty
of showing specfic acts of negligence, but the
authorities unanimously hold that the casual connection between the alleged negligent act and
the injury is never presumed and that this is a
matter the plaintiff is always required to prove
affirmatively. Res ipsa loquitur is limited to the
question of whether the defendant was negligent
-it has nothing to do with the element of causation. In Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power

13
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Co. v. Htmt, 9 Cir., 223 F. 952, 955, 139 C.C.A.
432, the rule is stated as follo-ws: '* * * In every
personal injury case the plaintiff must establish
two propositions : First, that the defendant was
negligent; and, second, the causal connection
between the negligence and the injury complained of. Negligence is sometimes presumed,
as in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies, or where there has been a violation of
a statutory duty, but the proximate cause of an
injury i·s never presumed. On this question there
is no conflict of authority.' See also Howe v.
Michigan Cent. R. Co., 236 Mich. 577, 211 N.W.
111; Alabama Power Co. v. Bryant, 226 Ala.
251, 146 So. 602; Allen v. Republic Bldg. Co.,
Tex. Civ. App., 84 S.W. 2d 506." (Italics added)
After setting forth the law governing the case, the
court turned to the evidence in the record and stated:
"In the instant case, apart from the question
of negligence, we have the problem of whether
the injury to plaintiff's left ankle was caused
by the heat from defendants' lamps. The fact
that the plaintiff was injured does not raise a
presumption or authorize an inference that the
defendants' acts or on1issions proxilnately caused
the injury. The important question in the case
before us, therefore, is not, should the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur apply to establish negligence,
but rather, is there any evidence from which a
jury could find that the lamps used by defendants were the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries~ On this question defendants' expert
witness, Dr. Plu1nb, testified as to the construction, operation and heat producing effects of
both lamps. As to the first, or what was identified as the depolray la1np, his testimony was that
it could have no possible effect upon the human

14
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body and that it would not produce nwre heat
than an ordinary 25-watt globe; that it was in
the nature of a 1nagnet and that a greater mnount
of magnetism passes through the body of every
one by reason of the earth's natural magnet than
could be created by this lmnp. * * *
"Analyzing the testimony to determine
whether or not plaintiff has sustained a burden
of proving a causal connection between the alleged negligent acts of the defendants and the
injury to the plaintiff, we find that under the
present record the jury would be required to
speculate and guess on too many elements in
the chain of causation."
And so it is with the instant case. The jury ca11
only speculate as to whether any harmful substance
was ever emitted from the flare stack, and if so, whether
such hannful substance was the precise substance deposited on the plaintiffs' automobiles that caused the
damage. Mrs. Gwynn saw the flare burning on top of
the stack (R 80). She saw a trailing of smoke (R 80).
This smoke was clearly carbon black and inert (R 147,
148, 158, 236). She states that some material was deposited on her automobile (R 85). The jury can only
speculate that the substance that damaged the paint
came from the flare stack. It cannot ignore the testimony
presented by the defendant.
Competent witnesses testified that no such harmful
material could be emitted and that if any black "soot"
was seen trailing the flame at the top of the flare stack
the same would be nothing but pure carbon and completely chemically inert (R 147, 148, 158).
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~rhe

substance which damaged the plaintiffs' autonwbiles could have come from the acid plant or could
have been blown from some diesel or other vehicle
or train passing by on one of the highways or tracks
adjoining the lot where the plaintiffs' automobiles were
parked or frmn some other unknown source. It is nothing
but speculation or conjecture to find that the "soot"
or whatever the substance was that damaged the plaintiffs' auton1ohiles came from the flare stack.
It appears that the jury employed the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur not only to find negligence on the
part of Phillips but to find that "soot" was emitted
from the flare stack and dmnaged plaintiffs' automobiles.
This it cannot do. Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 9 A. (2d)
572 (Md. 1939).
POINT II.
THE EVIDEN·CE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT PERMIT
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR.

Since the plaintiffs at the trial of the case relied
entirely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish
the alleged negligence of the defendant it is obviously
necessary that the evidence support every element required for the application of the doctrine.
(a) Eleuwnts necessary to invoke the doctrine of

res ipsa loquiJhtr:
In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
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this court has recognized that the following elements
must be present:
"(1) That the accident was of a kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed; (2) That
it happened irrespective of any participation by
the plaintiff; and (3) That the cause thereof
was something under the management or control
of the defendant, or for which it is responsible."
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
5 Utah (2d) 373, 302 P. (2d) 471 (1956)
(b) Proof of element No. 1 is totally lacking.

Now, for the sake of argument, if it be assumed
that "soot" from the defendant's flare stack did cause
the damage to the plaintiffs' automobiles the situation
is not ~like the case of Zampos v. Uni,ted Smelt1ing,
Refining and Mining Co. 206 F. (2d) 171 (·CCA-10,
1953). In that case an action was brought for the
recovery of damages caused by a flood. The plaintiffs
in their complaint alleged that the defendants owned
certain mining property in Bingham Canyon, Utah; that
the plaintiff owned certain property situated near such
nrining property; that the defendants negligently stored
water in the tunnels and drifts of its mining property;
that it negligently allowed this stored water to sweep
down upon the property of the plaintiff and that damage
resulted. The defendants denied negligence and pleaded
that the flood water was unusual, extraordinary, unprecedented, and not reasonably to be anticipated by
any ordinary prudent person, etc. There apparently was
no genuine issue as to any material fact and on motions
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for su1nn1ary judg1nent the trial court entered judgment
for the defendants. The plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Said the court:
"* * * It is the law in Utah that in order
for a plaintiff to prevail upon the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur he must show that the thing
or instrumentality which caused the injury was
in the exclusive custody and control of the defendant; that the accident or occurrence was of
a character which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence; and that when these
facts are shown the evidence is sufficient to
warrant an inference that the defendant did not
exercise due care. Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 P. 201; Angerman
Co., v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 P. 169, 79
A.L.R. 50. The inference arises in part from the
fact that the happening was such that it would
not be likely to occur unless someone was negligent. White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 P. 2d
249. And if the circumstances are equally consistent with a cause which would not be attributable to negligence, the doctrine does not apply.
Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 49
P. 2d 958. The mining property in question was
in the exclusive custody and control of the defendant. But there was a complete absence of
any showing that the flood U'as of a character
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence. The circu1nstances disclosed were
equally consistent with a cause not attributable
to negligence on the part of the defendant. The
facts were not sufficient to sustain an inference
that the defendant was negligent either in storing
the water on its pren1ises or knowingly permitting
it to accumulate there, or that it accumulated
there under circumstances with which the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care should have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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been familiar." (Italics added)
Assuming without adn1itting that ''soot" did cause
the dan1age to plaintiffs' automobiles, such an occurence
would not be an~, indication that the company was negligent. The flare stack is a necessary part of and is
located at a refinery operation. What evidence is there
to show that the incident complained of would not have
happened in the ordinary course of events had due care
not been observed.
Assun1ing for the sake of argurnent that a substance
might on this one particular occasion have been ernitted
from the flare stack that does not raise any inference
of negligence. As was stated in the Zampos case ". . .
there was a complete absence of any showing that the
flood (soot) was of a character which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence. The circumstances
disclosed were equally consistent with a cause not attributable to negligence on the part of the defendant."
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be applicable,
it is essential that it shall appear that the transaction
in which the accident occurred was in the exclusive
management of the defendant and that all elements
of the occurrence were wtihin his control, and that the
result was so far out of the usual course that there
was no fair ~nference that it could have been prod~tced
by any other cause than negligence. Clark v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 6 A (2d) 892 (Pa. 1939).
(Italics added.)

In order to render the res
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loquitur doctrine
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applicable the nature and circumstances of accixlent must
be of such character that there could be no reasonable
inference but that the injury complained of was due to
defendant's negligence or to the negligence of others
for whose ,acts the defendant is legally responsible.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 158 S.W. (2d)
721 (Tenn. 1942). (Italics added)
(c) Proof of element No. 2 is totally lacking. As
stated in Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. supra,
it is also fundamental that for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to be applicable the instrumentality causing the
dmnage must be shown to be in the exclusive control of
the defendant. Assuming that "soot" in this case did
cause the damage, there is no direct showing that the
origin of the "soot'' was in the control of the defendant,
or that it was emitted from any of the facilities owned
and operated by the defendant as discussed in Point No.
1 of this brief. As already noted the plaintiffs have
merely shown their damage, the wind direction and
the existence of the flare stack and flame from which
they would have the jury infer that the "soot" came
from the flare stack and caused the damage to the
plaintiffs' automobiles. In other words, from weak inconclusive circumstantial evidence the jury inferred that
the "soot" came from the flare stack of the defendant.
Having 1nade this inference the jury then took the next
step and with the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inferred that the defendant Phillips Petroleum Company
was negligent in spite of the elaborate testin1ony on the
part of the defendant's witnesses regarding the care
·that had been taken. We thus have an inference upon
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an inference which has long been conden1ned in the
law. 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 116.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can never be
invoked to prove that the agency causing the injury
was in control and possession of the defendant, since
such fact must be proved by "evidence" and not by
"presumption" which is not evidence. Armour & Co.
v. Leasure, 9 A. (2d) 572 (~fd. 1939)
Other possible sources of the "soot" causing the
damage to plaintiffs' automobiles were not eliminated.
It is well settled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply in the case of an unexplained accident
which may have been attributable to one of several
causes for some of which the defendant is not responsible.
Where the evidence shows that an accident may
have happened as the result of one of two or more
causes, and it is not more reasonably probable that it
was due to the negligence of the defendant than to any
other cause, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply. Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W. (2d) 1020
Tex., Civ. App.
If the accident can be accounted for on any reasonable theory other than that of defendant's negligence,
the maxim of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied. Paul
v. M osberg Realty Corporation, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 766 (N.
Y. City Ct. 1942).

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply,
where defendant does not have control or management
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of the thing causing the injury. Kentucky Utilities Co.
1/. S1.~tton's Adm/r, 36 S.W. (2d) 380 (Ky. 1931). There
n1ust be direct testimony therefore demonstrating that
the injury can1e from the stack. This can not be inferred.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon necessity
of requiring defendant to explain how the injury
occurred where the explanation is peculiarly and exclusively within his knowledge, but does not require
defendant to show that plaintiff was injured by an
instnunentality not under his control. JJie.adows v. Patter~on, 109 S.\V. (2d) 417 (Tenn. 1937).
~l_1he

rule is not applicable where the result might
have been caused by one of two causes neither of
which is excluded by evidence. J.liartin v. Arkansas Power
& Light Co., 161 S.W. (2d) 383, (Ark. 1942).
To justify the invocation of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine instrumentality which caused injury sued for
must have been under defendant's exclusive management,
and the doctrine is inapplicable where the cause of the
accident is unexplained and it might have been due to
one of several causes for smne of which defendant is
not responsible. Davidson v. American Liq_u~d Gas Corporation, 89 P. (2d) 1103 (Cal. 1939)
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon the
assu1nption that the thing which causes the injury is
under the exclusive management and control of the defendant, and that the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of events does not happen without fault; of deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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explanation sufficient to rebut inference that defendant
failed to use due care. To overcmne inference of negligence arising from operation of rule of res ipsa loquitur,
defendant is not required to account for the occurrence
and show the actual cause of injury, but merely to rebut
the inference that he failed to use due care. Davis v.
Teche Lines, 7 So. (2d) 365 (La. 1942)
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitu1·
does not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a judgment,
but where the defendant produces evidence to rebut the
inference of negligence arising under the doctrine, it
is ordinarily a question of fact whether such inference
has been dispelled. Druzanich v. Criley, 122 P. (2d) 53
(Cal. 1942)
Even if the jury had been justified in inferring
that the "soot" caused the damage, and inferring that
the "soot'' came from defendant's flare stack, what evidence is there of any negligence on the part of Phillips.
Absolutely none! The plaintiffs have relied wholly upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant's evidence
from impartial third party experts proved there was
no negligence and as a matter of law, in absence of
any further proof by plaintiff, any inference of negligence on the part of Phillips has been completely
overcome.
There IS no suggestion in the evidence of what
Phillips could or should have done to have prevented
the "soot" from escaping from the flare stack-assuming
that it came from the stack. There is no intimation of
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what precautions Phillips should have taken. There is
a total lack of any direct evidence showing negligence
on the part of Phillips. On the other hand the record
is repleat with testi1nony showing the care with which
Phillips eonducts its operatons (R 161, 165, 168, 205,
206). Special attention has been given to the flare stack
itself (R 153, 156).
Con1petent witnesses testified that no such harmful
n1aterial could be emitted and that if any black "soot"
was seen trailing the flame at the top of the flare stack
the same would be nothing but pure carbon and complete!)~ chemically inert (R 154 ,167, 168).
An inference of negligence arising from the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur has been completely overcome. The
evidence does not support a finding by the jury that
Phillips was negligent.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDAN·CE WITH THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.6 OF
J.I.F.U.

The defendant in its fourth request (R. 59) asked
the court to instruct the jury as follows:
"The defendant Phillips Petroleum Company,
requests the court to instruct the jury in accordance to the following instructions contained in the
book, Jury Instruction Forms For Utah:
2.1, 2.3, 1.6, 15.1, 16.6"
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Particularly was it error for the court to refuse
to instruct the jury in accordance with instruction 1.9
which if given would have read as follows:
'

'

'1

'

"It is your duty to hear and determine this
case the same as if it were between two individuals. The fact that plaintiff is an individual and
the defendant is a corporation should make no
difference whatever to you. You should look
solely to the evidence for the facts and to the
Instructions given you by the court for the law,
and return a true and just verdict according to
the facts established by the evidence under the
law as laid down by the court, without reference
to the individual or private character of the plaintiff or to the business or corporate character
of the defendant. The defendant corporation is
entitled to the same equal protection under the
law as are all other individuals."
It is hard to conceive of a case where such an instrurtion was more appropriate and necessary than the instant
case. Here we have one of the large oil companies of
the United States being sued for a relatively small
sum by ordinary worlanen. One needs no experience
in the practicalities of court trials or the rudiments of
psychology to recognize that in this welfare era in which
we are living Phillips Petroleum Company is going to
be stuck for the damages if such a matter ever goes to
the jury. And that is exactly what happened. It cannot
be certain that the cautionary instruction, if given by
the court, would have caused the jury to render a
different decision. But certainly if justice is to be done
and if the defendant is not going to be taken advantage
of because of its large corporate status, the least it
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sl~ould

be able to expect is such an instruction. Under
the circun1stances of this case it was error to refuse
the instruction.
We are not unrnindful of some authorities which
have held that a corporation is not, as a matter of right,
entitled to such an instruction. See 19 C.J.S., Corporations, Sec. 1340 p. 1056; Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Vol. 9 Sec. 4687. However, we have not found any
case so holding where the difference between the parties
was as striking as it is in the instant case. Whatever
n1ight have been the result of past rulings on this
question in other jurisdictions involving different parties
and different circumstances such should not be controlling here. In this state we have available the excellent
compilation of instructions, Jury Instructions Forms for
Utah. The requested instruction is found among the approved instructions contained therein. With modern
juries inclined to be liberal with corporate funds, .it
cannot be certain that the jury would have heeded the
admonition contained in the requested instruction, but
without the instruction, Phillips Petroleum did not have
a chance.
The trial court should have granted the defendant's
!1otion to Dismiss when the plaintiffs rested their
case. Having failed to grant that n1otion it should
have directed a verdict in favor of Phillip's Petroleum
Company when all of the evidence was in.
The case should be remanded to the District Court
with instructions consistent with the foregoing.
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Respectfully submitted,
McKAY AND BURTON
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Macoy A. McMurray
Attorneys for PhiUips Petroleum Company, Inc.,
Defendant and Appellant

720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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